DEFENSE OF POLAND:
SEPTEMBER 1 - OCTOBER 6, 1939
| On September 1 at 4:45 A.M., fifteen-inch guns of the German
battleship Schleswig Holstein, ostensibly paying a "good will visit
to Gdańsk," opened fire on a 182-man garrison of the Polish fort Westerplatte.
One hour later German forces crossed the 1,500-mile Polish-German frontier,
attacking from the north, west and south. At the same time, massed German
bombers flew in to attack Polish airfields, communication centers, troop
concentrations and non-combatant civilians. Below, a numerical comparison of Polish and German forces clearly shows German manpower and weapons superiority: |
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| With few exceptions, weapons deployed by the Polish army were not as modern as those used by the Germans. One notable exception was the Polish bomber Łoś, which was designed and built in Poland. At the time, it was one of the best planes of its type in Europe; but, production had just begun and Poland had only forty such machines. Polish fighter planes P-11 were obsolete compared with the German Messershmitts. | |||||||||||||||||||||
| The German planes were often twice as fast, four to eight
times better armed and able to fly higher than the Polish machines, but
the Polish planes were more maneuverable. Polish pilots were superbly trained
and by clever maneuvering were able to score victories - perhaps that is
why German pilots called Polish planes "Wasps." Similarly, Polish
pilots called their own planes "Bees." On September 1, Germans bombed the main Polish airfields, but damage was relatively small; this is because, as early as August 27, all Polish military aircraft had been dispersed to small, well-camouflaged airfields scattered around Warsaw. Polish planes, although slow, were capable of taking off from and landing on small, improvised airfields. Under these circumstances, successes of Polish air force in air combat were as surprising as they were numerous. For example, between September 1-6, the Warsaw Fighter Brigade downed forty-three German aircraft and badly damaged another twenty-nine at a cost of thirty-eight own planes lost. Polish losses, although smaller in comparison with enemy losses, would have been unsustainable over any longer period of time. Poland did not have enough planes and pilots to endure over a long haul at that rate of attrition. Therefore, almost from the first day of the war, the German air force had complete mastery over Poland's skies. Polish bomber aircraft attacked German columns very effectively, but often their losses were disproportionate to the inflicted damage. For example, on September 4, in only one day, the Poles lost nine Łoś bombers - one-fourth of what they had altogether. From the very beginning, the Germans met with fierce resistance on the ground. The morale of the Polish army was very high, as the men knew that they were defending their country against a brutal aggressor and that their cause was ethically right. This conviction compensated in some measure for German advantage in number and quality of weaponry. Generally, Poles were much better at fighting at night, in close quarters, and in hand-to-hand encounters using bayonets. Germans had a greater advantage in the deployment of massed tanks and in the use of their air force for bombing raids - especially dive bombers and fighters used to strafe both Polish troop columns and civilians fleeing the Germans. The widespread notion that the Polish cavalry engaged in foolhardy attempts to charge German tanks in September 1939 is misleading. There were few isolated cases where Polish cavalrymen tried to break out between the tanks rather than surrender; but, as a rule, cavalrymen dismounted and operated like infantry before each engagement. Horses were used for transportation and were kept behind battle lines during an engagement. Each cavalry regiment was equipped with its own anti-tank and anti-aircraft artillery. Polish cavalry and infantry units were weaker in fire power and mobility than German panzer units, but their morale and determination helped enormously. The initial struggle with the invader on September 1 is depicted in the personal account of a Polish officer who took part in the engagement. The battle was fought near the Polish-German border in southwest Poland where the Polish Wolhynian Cavalry Brigade was fighting against the attacking 4TH German Panzer Division: |
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| The next attack was mounted at 1:00 P.M. by over fifty tanks and infantry. The first defense line of the Polish Brigade could not repulse it, and thus the German tanks broke deep into the brigade positions nearly reaching the guns of the 2ND Regiment of Horse Artillery. In the duel between tanks and artillery, the tanks were gaining the upper hand. Colonel Filipowicz directed a counterattack of his reserves, which again, with the help of the armored train, repulsed the attackers. Returning to the narrative: | |||||||||||||||||||||
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| In their Polish campaign, the Germans applied a new tactic
that came to be known as Blitzkrieg: by concentrating their armor, superior
fire power of their artillery and air attacks, they were successful in breaching
Polish lines. Exploiting these breakthroughs they thrust armored columns,
penetrating the rear of Polish defenses. This tactic was facilitated by
motorized transport, which proved much faster than the speed of Polish infantry
and cavalry. Also, the strafing and bombing refugees increased chaos and
terror, and blocked roads along which Polish troops were withdrawing. On September 9, between Łódź and Warsaw, on the Bzura River, the Poles launched a counterattack which completely, surprised the Germans: "What happened was really unbelievable," recollects German General Erich von Manstein. "Everything was going so well and according to plan, that it was difficult to imagine anything happening to change our plans." Yet, in reality, five Polish infantry divisions and four brigades of cavalry launched a surprise counterattack. When German command received news of Polish cavalry presence at the rear and flanks of their 30TH Infantry Division, they realized the severity of the situation. On September 11, they brought in reserves, but so did the Poles. After three days of bitter fighting, German materiel and manpower superiority finally tipped the scale, and German troops resumed their offensive. On September 17, implementing the secret protocol of the Ribbentrop-Molotow pact, Soviet troops crossed the Polish- Soviet border. They encountered less resistance than the Germans, since an overwhelming majority of Polish troops had moved west to fight the Germans. This attack predetermined the hopelessness of the struggle against two powerful enemies attacking from the west and east. Poland did not surrender to the Germans or Russians, although further fighting was now hopeless. |
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| Henceforth, the Polish army fought only for its honor. The Germans had to pay dearly for every step eastward, and heavy fighting continued in central and eastern Poland. Four nests of resistance deserve honorable mention: | |||||||||||||||||||||
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1.) Westerplatte. A Polish garrison of 182 near Gdańsk, Westerplatte was bombarded by the German battleship Schleswig Holstein since the first day of the war and was attacked continuously thereafter by German infantry. According to a pre-war plan, the garrison located in five bunkers was expected to hold out for six hours when attacked, by which time a relief column was supposed to reach the defenders. But, in actuality, no relief column ever arrived, and the garrison held out until food and ammunition were exhausted - that is, after seven days of fighting.
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| The Polish navy consisted of five destroyers, five submarines,
six minesweepers and a number of support vessels. Four days before the German
attack, three destroyers were sent to England to carry on the struggle against
Germany together with the British fleet. The ships which remained in the
Baltic were, from the first day of the war, under constant attack from the
German air force and suffered damage. Three submarines were interned in
Sweden, and two managed to reach British shores. One of these, Orzeł (Eagle),
was initially interned in Tallin, Estonia, where it arrived to disembark
its commander who had contracted typhoid. Under German pressure, Estonians
commandeered the submarine, seizing all maps and some armaments and torpedoes.
On September 18, Polish sailors managed to disable electric installation
in the port and under the cover of darkness guided the submarine out of
the harbor despite Estonian artillery fire. The Poles reached British shores
by using maps drawn from memory. From then on, the Polish navy - fighting alongside its British allies, and later with the American navy in foreign seas - began a new chapter in its fight against Germany. Polish ships participated in the convoy services and in the 1944 Normandy landing. Also, the Polish destroyer Piorun fought in the battle against the German battleship Bismarck. For nearly an hour, in complete darkness, Piorun kept on a parallel course with the battleship, exchanging fire and signalling Bismarck's position to the British fleet so that it could not escape. During this time, it would have only taken one artillery hit from the bigger German battleship (25-times its size) to sink the Polish destroyer within seconds. Piorun's salvo weighed 290 pounds, whereas Bismarck was firing salvos weighing eight tons each. |
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| In the field of intelligence, the Poles provided the Allies with a priceless weapon: the ability to read the most secret German radio signals. Before the war, Polish cryptoanalysts had broken the secret of the German coding machine "Enigma" and had passed the secret, together with the reconstructed copy of the coding machine, to the French and the British two weeks before the outbreak of the war. The British made full use of that information, building a secret cryptological center at Bletchley Park, midway between Oxford and Cambridge. Throughout the war, they read German messages encoded on Enigma. | |||||||||||||||||||||
| But what happened to the French and British allies of Poland
in September 1939? In accordance with the military discussions held with
the French and the British in the summer of 1939, the Polish army was expected
to engage the Germans for the two weeks required to launch a major offensive
with seventy battle-ready French divisions across the Rhine. The Poles fulfilled
their obligation, but the French and the British did not. The only "help"
from these two allies was their declaration of war on Germany by September
3, three days after the Germans attacked Poland. However, these declarations
were not followed by any hostile acts towards Germany. While the Polish
army fought alone, ninety-two French divisions stood idle behind the Maginot
Line facing thirty-five third-grade German divisions. Hiller's gamble that
France and Britain would not attack ultimately paid off: he was able to
use all his forces against Poland. German losses in the Polish Campaign were as follows: |
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| In September 1939, in the war against the Germans, the Polish army suffered the following manpower losses: 66,300 killed, 133,700 wounded, and 420,000 taken prisoner. Most equipment and armaments of the Polish army were captured by the Germans. The Soviet army took 190,000 prisoners by the time hostilities from Polish regular army units ceased. | |||||||||||||||||||||